Credit Portfolio Management Group View on Restructuring (DRAFT)

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Credit Portfolio Management Group View on Restructuring (DRAFT)

As a general matter parties to privately negotiated derivative transactions

are free to include or exclude any contractual provision as mutually

agreed.  ISDA should not establish any market standards on which terms and

conditions must be included in any privately negotiated agreement, but it

should provide alternatives that parties may choose to use, not use, or

modify.

As it relates to Restructuring in the Credit Derivative Definitions,

parties are free to include or exclude it as a Credit Event.  The Credit

Portfolio Management Group recognises that the market may develop in a

"two-tiered" fashion whereby Credit Derivative Contracts trade with and

without Restructuring as a Credit Event. However, as a practical matter,

many banks that use Credit Derivatives as a tool to manage their firms' own

credit risk require that Restructuring be included as a Credit Event.  This

requirement may be due to internal credit policies or regulatory

considerations.

The current definition of Restructuring is considered by Sellers of

protection as too damaging when the triggering event is solely a Loan

Restructuring.  The damage to the Sellers of protection is primarily due to

the option that Buyers have to deliver any bond or loan with a maturity of

up to 30 years as settlement of the Credit Derivative contract.  Recent

events in the marketplace have confirmed these fears.

Given that many Buyers of protection will require Restructuring as a Credit

Event and that Sellers of protection feel the current definition is too

heavily tilted towards the Buyers, the Credit Portfolio Management Group

feels that the current definition needs modification.  These proposed

changes seek to meet the majority of the legitimate but divergent concerns

expressed by Sellers and Buyers.  Our proposal would make the following

changes:

1.   In Section 4.7, delete item (iv).  Item (iv) deals with subordination.

There has been substantial confusion among market participants regarding

this issue, and interpretations of this aspect of the ISDA Restructuring

definition have differed substantially.  This provision currently requires,

at least in non-sovereign situations, an express, consensual agreement by

holders to subordinate their Obligation.  A structural, or de facto

subordination of one type of Obligation as a result of amendments to

another Obligation of the Reference Entity, causing a decline in relative

value, would not itself constitute a Restructuring under clause b(iv) of

the current Restructuring definition.  Since a consensual subordination,

not coupled with any one or more of the changes specified in b(i) - (iii)

is not likely to occur in most cases, we believe this item can be removed

from the definition.  In addition rating agencies do not consider

subordination to be a Credit Event. However, in light of the confusion

surrounding subordination in relation to the "Pari Passu Ranking"

Deliverable Obligation Characteristic, we urge ISDA to take this

opportunity to clarify the issue.  As currently written, in a credit

derivative in which this Characteristic is applicable, the Definitions

would exclude any otherwise eligible Deliverable Obligation which became

subordinated after the trade date of the transaction.  We suggest that an

obligation which satisfies "Pari Passu Ranking" on the trade date of a

credit derivative but which loses that status in connection with a

Restructuring (modified as suggested in this proposal) would remain an

eligible Deliverable Obligation.

2.   In Section 4.7 (b) add language which would exclude bilateral, or

single lender bank debt and exclude actions taken by the bank lending group

that do not require at least a supermajority to agree. Restructuring would

not apply for bilateral loans and amendments to a loan agreement that only

require a simple majority vote.  We understand that Sellers are

particularly concerned about vesting a single hedger/lender with the

ability to create a triggering event.  Limiting Restructuring to

multi-lender situations provides a more reliable likelihood that a

Restructuring is a valid indicator of a Credit Event since it is accepted

by lenders with varied objectives.  In cases where a Buyer is hedging a

bilateral loan, such as those credits which are effectively agented by

borrowers with a series of bilateral loans, language to include bilaterals

can be agreed by the parties to the particular default swap.  In the spirit

of offering a broadly usable, credible compromise, we believe this is the

most constructive approach.

3.   Add a definition of a Restructured Loan.  This is needed to

distinguish the more narrow terms which are being suggested for settlement

triggered by Restructuring of Loans.

4.   Modify the Settlement process if the Credit Event being cited is a

Restructuring of a Loan.  We note that the ISDA definitions contemplate

that a single Credit Event is cited in a Credit Event Notice.  Where

multiple Credit Events may have occurred, in practice, the Notifying Party

would cite the most clearly demonstrable of such events.  But in cases

where Restructuring based upon a Loan is cited, we propose narrower

settlement provisions.  If the Buyer triggers, the Seller may require that

the Buyer deliver only the Restructured Loan.  If the Seller triggers, then

the Buyer may deliver whatever the contract allows.  We feel that this will

prevent ?gaming? by either the Buyer or the Seller.

5.   Allow for an Alternative Settlement method if the proper consents to

assignment of the Restructured Loan are not obtained in a timely fashion.

If delivery of the Restructured Loan cannot be achieved within the Physical

Settlement Period (Section 8.5 of the Definitions) due to the non-receipt

of required consents, then delivery would be effected via a new

?restricted? Credit Derivative. The Buyer of the triggered Credit

Derivative would be the Buyer of the restricted Credit Derivative. The

restricted Credit Derivative would be limited to the Restructured Loan

i.e., it would have as Reference Obligation the Restructured Loan. In

addition, the restricted Credit Derivative would be written to the final

maturity of the Restructured Loan and it would pay the contractual ?all-in?

drawn spread (e.g., including applicable Facility Fees, etc.) on the

Restructured Loan. If a Credit Event occurs while the restricted Credit

Derivative is outstanding, the Deliverable Obligation would be the

Restructured Loan (a Restructuring Credit Event would imply replacement or

restatement of the restricted Credit Derivative.)  Importantly, the

restricted Credit Derivative would be canceled and immediately replaced

with an assignment of the Restructured Loan if consents to assignment are

subsequently obtained. Also, if consent requirements fall away persuant to

the occurrence of other Credit Events (such as Failure to Pay), under the

applicable loan documentation, the parties would proceed with physical

settlement by assignment of the Restructured Loan. This approach,

cancellation of the restricted Credit Derivative when consent is obtained

or such requirements fall away, reflects the fact that consents are likely

to be received in due course and the ultimate intention is to effect

Physical Delivery of the Restructured Loan. Entering into the restricted

Credit Derivative only ensures that the Buyer is able to maintain the

protection of the triggered Credit Derivative in the event that consents

are not immediately received. Additional requirements that certain

participants may need, such as the posting of collateral, can be addressed

during the negotiation phase of the original transaction.

6.   In evaluating these proposed modifications, issues relating to other

provisions in the Definitions unavoidably arise.  Many of these issues are

being discussed by market participants, either as items which should be

reconsidered or revised.  In an effort to avoid distracting the critical

need to reach a satisfactory compromise on Restructuring, we believe it is

preferable to address these other issues separately.  They should be open

for discussion as ISDA considers a User's Guide and other proposed

revisions to the Definitions

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