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The rollover risks sovereigns are accepting in exchange for cheaper funding
It's not the juniors in capital markets who need protecting from obsolescence. They stand to benefit most from the deployment of AI
Investors and techniques are ready for development banks to scale up securitization rapidly
Risks in exchange-traded funds holding CLOs are real, but there could be scope to relax the rules
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  • It seems unlikely, but a French soap maker may mean more for Hong Kong’s stock market than a Russian metals company almost six times its size.
  • FIG
    The never-ending back and forth over Greece’s bail-out has put most of the European credit markets in deep freeze. So why then is securitisation so healthy?
  • As an increasingly diverse range of European borrowers find attractive bond market funding, banks’ blinkered fixation with top-end companies may be hindering real development in the loan market.
  • They saved Bear so they’ll save Lehman. They let Lehman go, so AIG is next. The rules changed from day to day back in September 2008 — and chaos ensued. So, now that Portuguese spreads are higher than the 5% at which Greece is supposedly allowed to borrow, will it too be bailed out? It’s time for a set of rules to define the European fiscal crisis — else Tuesday’s bond market chaos will run and run.
  • A lack of supply in the loan market is pushing margins for the best borrowers tighter and leading to big oversubscriptions. But lucrative underwritten deals have yet to make a comeback. That could change if any brave lender decides to up the stakes.
  • If Goldman Sachs actively misled investors in its Abacus 2007-AC1 CDO it deserves punishment. It’s a big if and at some point the principle of caveat emptor must apply. Whatever happens, it is perverse to hang the government’s flagship fraud cases on two investors brought low precisely because they had an excessively bullish view on subprime CDOs