By Taimur Ahmad
In an exclusive interview with Emerging Markets, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, until recently the UK's top diplomat in Iraq, for the first time reveals his split with the US administration over policy in the Middle East nation ? and the war's aftermath.
It is somewhat ironic that the think-tank Sir Jeremy Greenstock now runs cites advancement of the Anglo-American relationship as one of its primary aims. As Britain's top envoy to Iraq, a post which he left in March after six months, Greenstock is said to have clashed with his less experienced US counterpart, Paul Bremer, in personality as well as on policy.
Greenstock won't be drawn on the specifics of that relationship, although he is thought to have become increasingly frustrated at the way Bremer was running the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). But over half a year since his departure from Baghdad for the greener removes of Oxfordshire, Greenstock is now the first time publicly expressing his deeper misgivings about the invasion of Iraq and the handling of its aftermath:
?If after a considerable period with us still being engaged [in Iraq] the situation does not improve I think people will just come to the objective judgment that the whole thing was just not worth what we ? the US and the UK ? put into it, and therefore history will be unbiased in its judgment,? he says.
He had been planning his retirement for some time. He vigorously denies charges that he left Iraq in frustration: ?I'd planned from the beginning that I'd do a certain amount of time and that I wanted to do other things which I'd already planned for myself.?
In fact, he was just about to retire from his stint as the UK's ambassador to the United Nations when Prime Minister Tony Blair called for his help in Iraq. When Greenstock arrived in Baghdad last year, British officials hoped that such a high profile and authoritative figure would be able to steer the CPA in a moderate direction. His job was to help the Americans develop a political process to end the occupation as soon as feasible and leave Iraq stable enough to sustain its own government with the consent of the people.
But the burgeoning violence in recent weeks makes it difficult for him to keep private his reservations about decisions taken on the ground.
?The dangers and the difficulties we're seeing now were predicted by some,? he says. ?We always felt that it would be a lot harder getting Iraq right than perhaps some people in the Pentagon did, at least in the US administration, and some others knew perfectly well that it would be difficult.?
Greenstock believes that the rapidly deteriorating situation is partly a function of poor planning by the CPA. ?On the security front, which was not my responsibility as the main choices were made before I got there, I think there should have been an earlier over-insurance ? in terms of discipline, in terms of numbers of troops on the ground ? that we were in control, and that Iraqis could take over a controlled scenario rather than an uncontrolled scenario,? he says. ?There was underinvestment in those early stages which has dogged us ever since.?
Divergent views
?One wished that the whole thing could have produced a greater success even sooner but I think that the original objectives set were to some extent unrealistic and we have to live with that. We did what we could,? he says. ?We [British] weren't in the lead there, but it was very interesting working with the Americans as well as the Iraqis.?
Of equal concern to Greenstock is the fact that only a fraction of the $18.4 billion that were apportioned by the US Congress for reconstruction has actually been spent. Moreover, hardly any of the objectives of the aid package have been met. Indeed projects which could have had a direct bearing on the government's ability to deal with the security situation have not even been completed.
?I've certainly been very disappointed that the money hasn't flowed even faster and indeed I think Paul Bremer was and [US ambassador] John Negroponte must be working on it now,? he says. ?I never really understood why it didn't flow faster. Even last winter the intricacies of the [US political] administration, the congressional system, were beyond me to fathom.?
He believes that substantial sums were needed at an earlier stage ?to generate a confidence that would have produced more support for what the Americans were trying to do. So to some extent it was an own goal that it didn't flow faster.?
But in making a judgment about the justification of the war, the question might be asked whether people in general are better or worse off now than before the war started? ?On the whole, most of them don't know yet,? he says, circumspectly. But he adds: ?They're not necessarily better off in terms of security or law and order in a community sense. They're not yet better off in an economic sense, although they sense the change in terms of their growing capacity for freedom of choice. But the choices available to them are too few.?
?The state's first duty to its citizens is to provide security so that their seizing of the opportunities that are available can happen. And that is not yet there, there's no doubt about that.?
Development or security?
More generally, however, Greenstock is mindful that the world's preoccupation with Iraq could prove detrimental to the developing world: ?I would say very firmly that the needs of the developing world generally must not be allowed to suffer from what is put into Iraq.?
?I agree that it [Iraq] takes some of the focus and the momentum out of the development agenda. We've got a hell of a lot to do to meet our development targets,? he adds.
But still, he makes a strong case for not giving up on Iraq. ?We have to keep going. We mustn't let them [Iraqis] down. A new administration of one colour or another in Washington must live up to the American promise of continued support through the transitional process. And I hope the UK will do the same.?
One of the key hurdles in getting Iraq right is renegotiating its debt, which stands at about $120 billion. ?The debt is so large that it cannot be repaid in any meaningful or economically sensible way. I'm afraid that creditors have got themselves some bad debt here and they've got to realize that.? But, he says, ?for the sake of discipline and order there should be a certain percentage paid back. Iraq has got a large economic potential in the future, and must recognize that it got itself into a mess and pay some of it back. But it's got to be in my view a number much lower than 50%.?
Setting up an IMF programme is a precondition, for instance, for renegotiating Iraq's $43 billion debt with the Paris club of official creditors. So sorting out the fine points of an IMF programme ? something which itself has not been without controversy, even within the Fund's executive board itself ? is a matter of political as much as an economic urgency.
?Establishing an IMF programme that speeds up the business of growing confidence in Iraq among investors who are interested in Iraq's future could be very helpful,? says Greenstock.
?The sooner we get Iraq off our worry list, the sooner everybody will return to the normal business of development, and funding economic growth under IMF terms. So I think there is a self-interest for the IMF board in getting Iraq off the crisis agenda.?
?The real judgment will be made by history on the wider picture now,? Greenstock reflects. ?The fact is that choices were made on evidence that didn't stand up in the end on the stockpiles [of weapons]. The reasons for going in were still very strong at the time. Because of that scenario [of no WMD] the judgment has to be left to later as to whether the whole thing was worthwhile.?
Does this in any way vindicate those who doubted the initial justification for war? ?The UN in terms of the inter-governmental majority probably feels vindicated that the Americans took on more than they could easily chew against America's own expectations,? he says.
Despite his reservations, Greenstock is still reserving for now his final judgment on the war and its aftermath. ?Heavens,? he snaps, momentarily losing his famed composure, ?you expect everything to happen overnight.?
Interview with Sir Jeremy Greenstock
EM: In light of the deteriorating situation on the ground in Iraq, do you think military intervention will be seen as a mistake? What are the main factors that would lead to such a judgment?
JG: We ? my wife and myself, she was there for a while ? talked to a whole range of Iraqi people, and never met anybody in Iraq who wasn't grateful for the fact that Saddam had gone. Obviously we never came across those who resented the fact that he was gone because it would have been dangerous to do so. But the vast majority of Iraq, nobody has any doubt about this, was grateful. That is one thing achieved even though it wasn't the original UK aim.
The dangers and the doubts and the difficulties now were predicted by some and we always felt that it would be a lot harder getting Iraq right than perhaps some people in the Pentagon did, at least in the American administration, and some others know perfectly well that it would be difficult.
You've got to give it time. And [Paul] Bremer and I posited a long transitional period. We may have recommended to our governments the bringing forward of the handover date of full responsibility to the Iraqis, but we set out a long transition period. We knew it would take a long time to get Iraq and its institutions and its security up to any kind of decent standard.
If after a considerable period with us still being engaged there, I think people will just come to the objective judgment that the whole thing was just not worth what we ? the US and the UK ? put into it, and therefore history will be unbiased in its judgment.
But I actually think Iraq will always from now on be different. This is a seminal change, however they take it forward themselves, and they will be extremely reluctant to go back to dictatorial oppression if they can avoid it. And I think actually that it will affect the region ? that we've helped to shake up a region that was getting stagnant in terms of unrepresentative, or undemocratic governments, and we'll have to see what comes out of it in the event, and see whether the Middle East is capable of reform.
And that is a feat that the international institutions, the UN, and its various bodies, and the financial institutions and the government involved, as well as the people of the region, have got to focus on, so I think the region needs help.
EM: In what ways do you think intervention in Iraq will actually lead to reform throughout the region?
JG: Well, if we succeed in giving back a certain power to people to choose or to reject their government then I think this will be noticed in the region. I think it will encourage a trend to some forms of democracy in places like Jordan and down the Gulf. It may speed up the insistence on some reform in Saudi Arabia. I think Iran and Syria will be more controlling over their populations. Egypt will be an interesting country to effect. I think Iraq is one of those Arab countries where developments do affect the rest of the Arab world. It's one of the historically leading areas of the region.
EM: You're talking of spreading democracy throughout the region as if it's a done deal, and moreover that people will take kindly to the political change ? and intervention ? in Iraq. But isn't welfare and development more important to the region and its people?
JG: I've been careful not to pretend that we're thinking about Western style democracy. The Iraqis and indeed other Arab and maybe other Islamic countries have got to decide what form of political and constitutional structures, what form of popular representative leadership institutions are necessary for government to run with the consensus of the people, rather than an idealized or an imposed form of democracy from some other region.
I think Islamic countries in particular have got to adapt their own forms [of governance]. I think we've seen recently some reasonably successful examples: Malaysia is one example, Indonesia is going through a series of changes towards ? they want central authority but there is a form of democracy that works, and there are other examples. But in the Arab world there are still too few, in my view.
EM: But how can one really talk about a return to democracy in Iraq next year when there is still a sizeable ? 100,000 odd ? foreign troops on Iraqi soil? Isn't it premature and misleading to talk about Iraq returning to democracy, as the American and British governments are doing, given that basic fact?
JG: No. I think there are plenty of examples where countries have begun to grow their own institutions even with foreign help very visible on the ground. We're beginning to work through programmes and I think the Balkans example is one that shows how long it takes. But in Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia we have had troops on the ground, particularly in Kosovo, and we are beginning with some ups and downs, beginning to grow some of the institutions, which are necessary for the future. They've got the incentive of wanting eventually to belong to a wider Europe.
Iraq has got different incentives for settling down and producing institutions that work but I don't think you can just say that because they still need troops on the ground they can't begin to grow institutions that will serve their democratic intentions in the future.
EM: I suppose it's a credibility issue as well and the fact is that any new government might be seen as indirectly subservient to the physical power in the form of a military presence on their soil.
JG: I think to some extent [Prime Minister] Allawi's interim government, even though it's not elected and is heavily dependent on the Americans for security, has shown that it can do its own thing and make its own decisions. When there is an election in Iraq for a new assembly in the new year, an election that will no doubt be dogged by violence, the legitimacy will grow. And when there is a further election, the legitimacy will grow further. Heavens ? you can't expect everything to happen overnight.
So there is a transfer of responsibility and competence even while we have troops on the ground. And that graph will go even more steadily more steeply up towards full Iraqi responsibility and competence as we go through time.
You can't just walk away from this. Nor can Iraqis. It's their country. And if you left them to their own devices right now it would be a lot worse. There are a lot of relative choices being made and although some things have gone wrong in the main structures we've made the right decisions.
EM: Do you think the government's case for war has suffered by the lack of apparent weapons of mass destruction, which after all was a pivotal part of their argument?
JG: This still has to be played out in the British political scene. I maintain two things: one, that in the period leading up to the war that we thought that [WMD] was there and all the evidence seemed to indicate, and all the advice to the prime minister indicated that the threat was there. That it didn't materialize, or hasn't yet materialized in the searches done on the ground, was in a sense a setback out of the blue.
Second, the real judgment will be made by history on the wider picture now. I'm not saying that WMD will lessen in importance, people feel very strongly about that but I think that the accusations that people were duped are much too strong, that is putting a very political stance on it.
The fact is that choices were made on evidence that didn't stand up in the end on the stockpiles. The reasons for going in were still very strong at the time. Because of that scenario the judgment has to be left to later as to whether the whole thing was worthwhile.
EM: To that extent do you think the United Nations and those who doubted the justification for war have been vindicated?
JG: The UN in terms of the inter-governmental majority probably feels vindicated that the Americans took on more than they could easily chew against America's own expectations. But the schadenfreude doesn't last very long when you see how strong the ripples are from an unstable Iraq.
I think everybody now wants it to come out right, and that was the spirit in the Security Council from Resolution 1483 onwards, at the end of May 2003. The UN has to some extent got together to try and make sure that this comes out right. As I've said before, we are where we are.
EM: From the current standpoint do you think people are better or worse off now than before the war started?
JG: On the whole, most of them don't yet know. They're not necessarily better off in terms of security law and order in a community sense. They're not yet better off in an economic sense but they sense the change in terms of their growing capacity for freedom of choice. But the choices truly available to them are too few.
There need to be more jobs, more economic regeneration and a greater sense of social stability. And I think they still put law and order first. I think therefore they're prepared to compromise in terms of freedom, and democracy because they want law and order and jobs first, but they haven't yet seen those come through.
EM: Can one meaningfully talk of development when there isn't any security? Can there be development without security?
JG: Not in the long term. Development is beginning to talk place. Institutions are beginning to form in civil society. The professions are beginning to get down to work with too little resources but a certain amount of freedom of choice. The universities and the schools and the businesses are all reopening. And the trading activity from a fairly low level of sophistication has a good deal of momentum behind it.
But the state's first duty to its citizens is to provide security so that their seizing of the opportunities that are available can happen. And that is not yet there, there's no doubt about that.
EM: What role do you think the United Nations can play in Iraq, especially given the violence that has so tragically plagued it?
JG: Well I think the resolutions have clearly laid that out. It's a question of whether it's possible for the secretary-general [of the UN] to implement those resolutions, given that phrase in several of them so far, which is ?if circumstances permit? which means if the security situation is good enough for UN staff to work there without fear for their lives.
Clearly the secretary-general is not in a position to make that decision, since the UN would be a target.
But the UN would have three primary roles. One is to have international staff on the ground to help the political process, the transitional process, to service the election process, with all its expertise in that area, to help with the training of civil institutions, the police, the human right's areas, strategies, and a certain amount of social reform where there is good UN expertise. So basic political support, both representationally and tactically.
Second is to allow for all the UN agencies to work in their own areas with the resources and the security they really need. And the third, perhaps in the longer term, is to establish a basis for general international support for the whole Iraqi process in the medium to long term, without the need for a coalition there under the Americans, to take over the international presence in Iraq and provide the support for Iraq that I think is going to need several years more than the actual transition period to actually settle down.
EM: This is all presupposing an adequate security situation on the ground. But that doesn't seem to be forthcoming at the present time, so to that extent it would seem that the entire mission of the UN is clearly quite compromised.
JG: It's going to be quite complex to organize it but just because there's a bad security situation doesn't veto the possibility. But the alternative, which is quite difficult for the UN to arrange, is to have a security force looking after it.
Remember Iraq isn't just one blanket area of rotten security. There are a lot of areas that actually work quite well. The UN could start in the north, for instance, continue to help with the Kurds. They were very instrumental in helping over the last 12 years. The south, with the Moqtada effect, has been more disturbing recently but the north has been somewhere where I felt the UN could probably start working.
There are other areas where the UN would be more likely to be targeted. There's probably nowhere you could say would be absolutely secure from a deliberate attack on the UN. There are people who can get anywhere to attack them.
EM: Do you think that there's a danger that if the UN fails in Iraq that its moral authority will be weakened and that its ability to be effective in any crisis will be similarly constrained?
JG: No. It's always been the case that the UN has found it difficult to be the main arbiter of change towards stability in the most difficult areas. The UN doesn't claim and cannot claim that it can intervene anywhere and succeed ? there are plenty examples of that in Africa. It never really got into Sri Lanka or Colombia to make a difference. It's not been able to settle the issue in Kashmir, although that's been the subject of UN activity further back in the past, because one side or the other doesn't allow that.
There are all sorts of areas and reasons why the UN can't necessarily succeed somewhere even though it may have the theoretical capability to do so. The secretary-general recognizes that. It's not to say that the UN hasn't got a huge amount of good to do in those parts that it can reach.
EM: In light of all this, what do you think the first thing that the new UN ambassador to Iraq needs to do? What should his first priority be?
JG: I think he's got to establish an office from which he and his team on the ground can begin to help and effect the process of transition by being there and bringing the UN's name and the UN's authority and the UN's expertise into it. I don't think it can be done from outside. The Iraqis need their own moral boosting. They need advice and expertise that is objective and international. And the first thing they've got to establish is a presence through which that effective advice can be offered. It can be done in the first few weeks and months, perhaps through this.
But the UN has got to re-earn respect and confidence in Iraq. It hasn't been the most popular of institutions, and that takes time. It takes presence on the ground. It takes quality and courage of those who are doing it. And it probably takes some time to establish that. But in my view it needs to be done and would make a difference in the medium term.
EM: Are you concerned that of the $18.4 billion that was apportioned by the US Congress, that only 2% of that has actually been spent and moreover that hardly any of the objectives of the aid package have been met? Indeed projects that could have had a direct bearing on the interim government's ability to deal with the security situation have not even been completed.
JG: I've certainly been very disappointed that the money hasn't flowed even faster and indeed I think Paul Bremer was and John Negroponte must be working on it now. I've talked to people still concerned with the US programme and they're sure that the money is beginning to flow faster now. But I never really understood why it didn't flow faster. Even last winter the intricacies of the administration, the congressional system, were beyond me to fathom.
EM: Did you put the question directly to Paul Bremer?
JG: Well he was putting the question to Washington. And I mean he fought rather brilliantly for the total sum, with his own Congress, and we have an enormous number of Congressmen coming through ? I think some 200 by the time I'd left ? and they continue to come, and they were mostly keen to support the process and for the money to flow.
I understand Iraqi disappointment that it hasn't gone through. I think that money will come and other donor money will come. But it was needed at an earlier stage to generate a confidence that would have produced more support for what the Americans were trying to do. So to some extent it was an own goal that it didn't flow faster.
I'm told it's accelerating faster now, but let's see whether or not that actually happens.
EM: With regards to its Iraq's policy, what would be your chief recommendation to the next US administration?
JG: Well I've said it again and again. We have to keep going. The support has to be there. We mustn't let them down. A new administration of one colour or the other in Washington must live up to the American promise of continued support through the transitional process. And I hope that the UK will do the same.
That is the prime minister's view. It means continued solid financial support, it means security, support on the ground physically with our military, until the Iraqi security services are fully grown and adult, and that to me means staying through to 2005.
EM: Given that only a fraction of the reconstruction funds have actually been spent, do you think that the US administration has failed to live up to its promises?
JG: Clearly one of the difficulties has been that projects haven't been able to be followed up with the speed that we'd originally intended because of the security situation. Project contractors have been threatened. The terrorists have known what they were doing in that respect. I mean it's an anarchist and desperately negative approach on their part, and the Iraqi people as a majority reject it, because it has an effect on the speed of the disbursement of reconstruction money. And a lot of effort and money has had to be spent on mending sabotage electricity and oil structures and the rest of it. But the money has to keep going. They do need more than what they're earning from oil, even with higher prices.
EM: On the question of Iraq's debt, do you think an entire write off is feasible?
JG: I think entirely is too strong because you damage the whole structure of international debt, and I think creditors have got to voluntarily agree, but the debt is so large that it cannot be repaid in any meaningful or economically sensible way. It was incurred by a regime that is no longer represented and no longer is Iraqi in the minds of Iraqis in terms of its commitments and its promises.
I'm afraid that creditors have got themselves some bad debt here and they've got to realize that. But I would have said that for the sake of discipline and order there should be a certain percentage paid back, and Iraq has got a large economic potential in the future, and must recognize that it got itself into a mess, and pay some of it back. But it's got to be in my view a number much lower than 50%.
EM: Do you think that in any way that the disproportionate attention paid to the question of Iraq's debt is in a broader sense is fair? I mean, why Iraq and not, say, Tanzania?
JG: Quite. And that's one of the reasons the debt should be repaid. The answer is of course a political and a real life one that where major governments get themselves involved in a big commitment. They want to see the money flowing and things working and that just happens to be the focus, and it is a subjective choice.
I would say very firmly that the needs of the developing world generally must not be allowed to suffer from what is put into Iraq. But remember that nearly everything that's been put into Iraq so far has come out of extra resources. It hasn't been stripped out of the development cash elsewhere, but I agree that it takes some of the focus and the momentum out of the development agenda. We've got a hell of a lot to do to meet our development targets.
EM: To that extent would you say that today's preoccupation with security globally, not only in Iraq but the entire war on terrorism as well, in a sense threatens to undermine the allocation of development aid worldwide?
JG: That's why we need the help of the developing world in combating security threats such as terrorism. That is what I was trying to do through the counter-terrorism committee at the UN, to try to get the whole of the UN membership to realize that terrorism is bound to affect all their interests and that it was essential to have a global coalition against it, not just because the West wanted it and the West was the main target of terrorism. It went much deeper and further than that. And to give them their due, most of them realized that.
EM: Did you see, from your vantage point in the UN, any concrete momentum in that regard, and if so, where?
JG: I do believe that in that period we managed to establish momentum. I'm afraid that the focus on Iraq and the controversy over Iraq took some of that momentum away. And in UN business of that kind, time tends to erode initiatives of that sort unless they're given a lot of focus. But I continue to believe very strongly that the response to terrorism has to be more than military and security in its nature. It has also to be economic, developmental, and social in terms of a change and re-altering of things. And I continue to believe that.
EM: Where do you see the World Bank and the IMF getting involved in Iraq ? what sort of roles should they have?
JG: I think it's difficult for them to come in at an early date because they're not constructed to come into areas where there are huge security problems. But if and when things settle down to a certain extent, I hope they're not too squeamish about beginning the business of establishing an IMF programme on Iraq.
I think that the World Bank in my view ought to be concentrating on what I would call the normal developing world. But if there are certain projects they could help in the early stages without taking resources out of other development programmes then I think that that would be perfectly relevant. But I think establishing an IMF programme that speeds up the business of growing confidence in Iraq among investors who are interested in Iraq's future could be very helpful.
EM: Senior Fund officials have said privately that they felt strong-armed by the US administration into getting involved in Iraq too soon, and without the proper mandate. Even within the Executive Board there's a lot of consternation about that point. What does this suggest to you?
JG: Well, the world is changing and security is not something that the international financial institutions can just say is not their concern, or the focus of the great powers with the money on certain areas is just not their concern. I agree with them that they should not be dragged off their main business by the question of Iraq, but I don't agree that there is no relevance for either of them in Iraq.
I think there is some relevance for the IMF in particular to do a programme for Iraq in the early years, and the sooner we get Iraq off our worry list, the sooner everybody will return to the normal business of development, and funding economic growth under IMF terms. So I think there is a self-interest for the IMF board in getting Iraq off the crisis agenda.
EM: Do you have any regrets about your time in Iraq?
JG: Not at all. It was challenging and obviously there were dangers all around us. It was extremely interesting. I very much enjoy working with Iraqis. I came to appreciate the quality of the people who are going to run the place and I was very glad to have that direct experience.
Obviously one wished that the whole thing could have produced a greater success even sooner but I think that the original objectives set were to some extent unrealistic and we have to live with that. We did what we could. We [the British] weren't in the lead there, but it was very interesting working with the Americans as well as the Iraqis.
EM: Is there anything you would have done differently?
JG: Not in the establishment of the political process. I think we should have perhaps made some of those decisions earlier, but then hindsight always kicks in with all of that.
On the security front, which was not my responsibility, and the main choices were made before I got there, I think there should have been an earlier over insurance, in terms of discipline in terms of numbers of troops on the ground, that we were in control. And that Iraqis could take over a controlled scenario rather than an uncontrolled scenario. There was under-investment in those early stages which has dogged us ever since.
EM: Are you glad to be out of Iraq?
JG: I'm not glad to be out of Iraq. I'd planned from the beginning that I'd do a certain amount of time and that I wanted to do other things, which I'd already planned for myself. I maintain contact with a number of people in Iraq and I retain a very strong interest in what's going on there. I will support it as much as I can.
EM: What are you doing now?
JG: I'm now director of the Ditchley Foundation, that's my main new career area. I will work as a consultant and adviser to one or two companies in London on global business and to some extent Middle East business, and I'll be combining those two main lines of operation.