Kosovo’s tortured path to independence has become a whole lot more complicated as prospects of a mutual agreement swiftly recede.
The seemingly unending saga of the province’s final status is halfway through its latest series of direct negotiations between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians, supervised by the so-called “Troika” of the United States, Russia and the European Union – but as yet there is not the slightest hint of agreement on the horizon.
If the sides fail to reach an agreement by the December 10 deadline – when the Troika are to present their report to the United Nations – things could get ugly, as Kosovo Albanians remain intent on declaring their independence.
In an interview with Emerging Markets, Muhamet Hamiti, senior political adviser to Kosovo president Fatmir Sejdiu, says he remains firmly opposed to any continuation of negotiations beyond that date and is critical of the current round of talks: “The so-called Troika process was unnecessary,” says Hamiti. “Kosovo and Serbia were involved in 14 months of negotiations in 2006 and 2007, resulting in the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari’s package of supervised independence for Kosovo as the only viable solution.”
Further negotiations do not find any support in Brussels also. “The Troika negotiations are a last, limited window of opportunity,” says Krisztina Nagy, spokesperson for Enlargement in the European Commission.
Kosovo Albanians will only agree to independence – with the Ahtisaari Plan as their minimum condition. Hamiti says that compromises to the Serbs have already been made: “The [Ahtisaari Plan] contains painful compromises, mostly concessions to the 5% Serbian minority, which gets unprecedented safeguards for any ethnic minority in Europe.
“How come that Kosovo, over 90% ethnic Albanian, should stay in any sort of relationship with Serbia?” asks Hamiti. “But one,” he continues: “as a fully-fledged neighbour. To this effect, our delegation has proposed to the Serbian delegation in London and New York a Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Cooperation between two independent nations: Kosovo and Serbia.”
The coming storm
Experts – including James Lyon, senior adviser at the International Crisis Group – warn of impending turmoil. “I suspect we will probably see a form of unilateral declaration of independence,” says Lyon. “Unless the Russians sign on, the topic of independence is very unlikely to hit the Security Council. At this stage, we see no indications that they are going to abandon their position.”
Aleksandar Simic, Kosovo adviser to prime minister Vojislav Kostunica, is digging in for a fight. Serbia – bitterly opposed to any unilateral declaration of independence – will press for further negotiations, he tells Emerging Markets. “Serbia will try to persuade the international community that December 20 is not the end of the negotiation process,” he says.
At stake, says Simic, is “stability not only in Serbia and Kosovo, but also in this part of Europe.”
He says any unilateral declaration will set a dangerous precedent. “There are a lot of situations in [the former Yugoslavia]; there are a lot of minorities who could then just get in line with the Kosovo Albanians and provoke other unilateral actions.
“It could be Macedonia, it could be Montenegro, it could be Republika Srpska [the Serb entity within Bosnia Herzegovina]; it could also be some countries which now seem to be very stable and which are already in the European Union, which seem to be very stable but are intrinsically unstable, not to mention Cyprus, but also some other countries.”
Partition
One mooted compromise, now under consideration by the Troika, is that the area of Kosovo north of the river Ibar, which is contiguous with the rest of Serbia, should remain part of Serbia while the rest of Kosovo becomes independent. This area, comprising half of Mitrovica and three other municipalities, has an overwhelming Serbian population and is vehemently opposed to Kosovo independence.
But Hamiti warns that “partition of Kosovo is dangerous business.”
“Independence for Kosovo within the current legal borders of Kosovo is the only solution that will bring peace and stability. Redrawing borders along ethnic lines is dangerous, for where do you stop?” he says.
“We have an Albanian minority community in southern Serbia, living in a territory adjacent to Kosovo. There is a sizable Albanian community in Macedonia. There is an Albanian minority in Montenegro.”
Partition has some advantages: Serbia may save some face by keeping part of Kosovo, while the Albanians relinquish an unruly part of the province. But, says Lyon, both sides will remain opposed to formal partition: “There are a lot of people in other countries who do not understand the dynamics here. There are a lot of emotions on both the Albanian and the Serb side on this issue,” he says.
Nevertheless, a de facto partition remains a “strong possibility”. If Kosovo declared independence, the Serbs north of the Ibar river are unlikely to cooperate with the new Kosovo authorities.
No turning back
Hamiti is firm on Kosovo’s final status: “Kosovo has embarked upon its road to nationhood, which is a road of no return. We will make sure that Kosovo’s independence is realized. It will involve a declaration of independence, and any declaration is unilateral by default.”
If the December 10 deadline passes, it remains unclear how swiftly Kosovo will move for its independence – or if it will hold back under pressure from the EU and US. Kosovo’s prime minister Agim Ceku said recently that independence was inevitable. “It has to happen. It has to happen very soon after December 10,” Ceku said. “We are talking about a couple of days, not weeks, not months.”
Says Lyon: “I think you should not be surprised if in the first half of next year, Kosovo does become independent and is recognized as such.”
But within the Troika, differences remain. The US firmly backs Kosovo independence, whereas Russia, a Serbian ally, has not ruled out vetoing any imposed UN Security Council resolution. “A solution to the Kosovo problem,” they say, “can be based only on international law. This presupposes, firstly, the need for a decision by the UN Security Council, and that decision can only come about when the parties have reached agreement between themselves.”
EU dilemma
The EU continues to vacillate, but supports the Ahtisaari Plan as “the basis for future work”. According to Nagy, the plan “is fair and balanced, and it provides the best available and possible solution that will advance stability, not only in Kosovo, but in the region as a whole.” The EU commissioner Olli Rehn is keen to stress the European nature of the issue: “The future of Serbia and Kosovo is in the European Union. Kosovo will not be the 51st State of the United States, and Serbia does not have the calling to rejoin the Russian federation!”
Nevertheless, EU policy on Kosovo remains torn. “There are a number of EU countries which look at Kosovo and immediately think of their own internal issues,” says Lyon. “Spain looks at the Basques and Catalonia, Hungary looks at its Slovak minorities, Cyprus sees its own partition issues, Romania sees some of its Hungarian minority issues, and Greece is traditionally pro-Serbia on this issue.
Two rounds of high-level talks have already taken place in New York and Brussels. Serbia, for its part, has offered a wide autonomy package within its current international borders. Simic says this package will be “unique in Europe because the level of autonomy [offered] is much higher than that southern Tyrol has in Italy, or Catalonia, Andalusia or the Basque region have in Spain.
“It is a substantial autonomy in which the Kosovo Albanians will have all the tools, all the instruments, all the institutions to manage their everyday life,” says Simic. “Kosovo will have only the elements of sovereignty that are normal for every sovereign nation, like foreign relations, like defence. There will be no Serbian troops in Kosovo; Kosovo will be demilitarized, which also means that there will be no provincial troops or paramilitary units, which means that the international military presence should remain in the province.”
“We do not want to regain anything that the Kosovo Albanians have gained during the UNMIK [UN Mission in Kosovo] presence,” concludes Simic. “What we want is to replace UNMIK authorities with Serbian authorities, with the exception of the military, because there will not be a Serbian military presence in Kosovo.”
Hamiti remains philosophical about the outlook. “There is no solution that will ‘satisfy all the parties’, as the diplomatic parlance has it,” says Hamiti. Asked whether Kosovo would accept any solution less than full independence, he says: “No, absolutely not.”