By Nick Saywell
Kosovo independence could spark fresh political turmoil in Serbia as ultranationalists position themselves for a comeback
On hearing news that Serbia had agreed a pro-western coalition government, the mood among European leaders was largely one of relief. The previous week had seen the election of extreme nationalist radical party leader Tomislav Nikolic as speaker of the parliament, a dark reminder of the country’s splintered past.
A new power sharing deal between pro-democracy parties will remove Nikolic from the country’s number two post, and, for the moment at least, temper fears of a resurgence of ultranationalists who led Serbia to four bloody Balkan wars in the 1990s.
But the jubilation may nevertheless prove short-lived. In Kosovo – the breakaway republic that has long sought independence from Serbia – talk is that sovereignty is but a few weeks away. The consequences, some believe, could be dire.
“Serbia will not accept Kosovo independence under any circumstances. Period,” warns James Lyon, special Balkans adviser to the International Crisis Group (ICG), a leading think-tank. Indeed, Kosovo’s independence could lead to a new era of international isolation for Serbia, he says.
Despite Vojislav Kostunica’s attempt to form a “democratic bloc” government, Lyon says that, on the issue of Kosovo, Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) will side in the Serbian parliament with the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), headed by alleged war criminal Vojislav Seselj, who is on trial at the Hague, and Slobodan Milosevic’s old party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS).
“The SRS, Kostunica and the SPS, who happen to make up 62% of the parliamentary deputies, won’t permit [Kosovo’s independence],” Lyon tells Emerging Markets.
There is nothing the international community can do to encourage Serbian consent on the question, Lyon says. “It does not matter what incentives or carrots are offered. Nothing that the West can do is going to make Serbia sign on or acquiesce to Kosovo independence. That is set in concrete.
“Some people in Brussels or Washington think that there are some sweeteners they can put out that would get Serbia to change its mind. This is based on wishful thinking and on a lack of understanding of the political reality in Serbia.”
Ahtisaari Plan
Kosovo’s status is due to be voted on at the UN Security Council. A proposal for “supervised independence” was put forward by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari in February – and swiftly condemned as “illegal” by a resolution of the Serbian parliament. The rebuke passed with an overwhelming 225 of the 250 deputies voting in favour.
Aleksandar Simic, Kosovo adviser to Kostunica, maintains his belief that the Ahtisaari Plan will fail. He tells Emerging Markets: “I cannot say that it is realistic that the Security Council would undermine the institution that it represents,”referring to the UN Charter, and to Resolution 1244 passed before the 1999 Nato bombing of Serbia that reaffirmed the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Simic is also relying on a Russian veto as a last resort.
Simic believes that a new solution to the Kosovo problem should be approached, but beforehand the US will have to do a U-turn on its “tacit promise that [the Kosovo Albanians] will be independent”.
The US’s resolve to ensure Kosovo becomes independent has been repeatedly confirmed, with under-secretary of state for political affairs Nicholas Burns declaring that his country was “absolutely committed” to that outcome. Former US Balkans diplomat Richard Holbrooke predicted last month that the US may recognize Kosovo even without a favourable vote in the Security Council.
Simic condemns such recognition moves. “This is the way that international politics should not be performed, because this is gambling. It is tampering with the international order, gambling with international stability.”
Kostunica stated in his address to the UN Security Council in February that any decision by a country to recognize Kosovo would be treated as null and void. Furthermore, Simic warns that relations between Serbia and any country that recognizes Kosovo’s independence would be affected “substantially”.
Lyon picks up the theme: “There is a very high probability that after a Kosovo independence declaration, Serbia will turn its back on the West. Once again there is almost nothing the West can do about this.
“We can be certain that whatever government is in power will use the parliament to force the hand of [Serbian president Boris] Tadic to cut off diplomatic relations with those countries that recognize an independent Kosovo. This could mean theoretically that Serbia starts heading into international isolation.”
Another issue that has already halted Serbia’s progress towards European integration – the case of alleged war criminal Ratko Mladic – will also be further than ever from resolution. Any nationalist backlash following a Kosovo solution will make it politically much more difficult to arrest Mladic, and it was this failure by Kostunica’s last government that caused the EU to suspend Stabilization and Association Agreement talks in May 2006.
Clashes
Lyon also warns of possible paramilitary clashes along the Ibar river dividing the northern, Serb part of Kosovo from the Albanians, although he says that the Serbian Army will not be involved. According to ICG analysis, this could result in a situation which “combines elements of Cyprus with the West Bank”.
One less gloomy prediction is that the Albanian-majority municipalities in the Presevo valley of southern Serbia will not see a repeat of the armed insurrection that broke out in 2000, due to the heavy Serb police and army presence there.
The Kosovo issue is a bitter pill Serbia has to swallow if it wants to return to normality, argues Lyon.
“Kosovo is horribly, horribly maiming and disfiguring politics both in Serbia and in Kosovo and in Bosnia. Until the Kosovo issue is put to rest, there will not be normal politics in these countries. Today in Serbia there is no economic reform, no debate on social reform, no debate on political reform, no debate on anything, largely because Kosovo monopolizes the political dialogue.”
Lyon does not advocate trying to divert Serbia from the course he predicts for it. “The fact is that if Serbia chooses to isolate itself, then we need to ask: ‘Why not let Serbia choose to isolate itself?’ It may last a certain amount of time, but there will come a certain point when Serbia will realize that it’s hitting its head against a wall, and has to move forward.”